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Abstract
New proofs are given for Monjardet’s theorem that all strong simple games
(i.e., ipsodual elements of the free distributive lattice) can be generated by
the median operation. Tighter limits are placed on the number of iterations
necessary. Comparison is drawn with the χ function which also generates all
strong simple games.
1 Introduction
In the preceding article, [3] we studied the composition of several games. In such
a composition, the voters of one game are replaced by committees each voting
according to the rules of the other games. Here, we remove the condition that the
committees be disjoint. In fact, adding dummy voters when necessary, we may
assume without loss of generality, that each of the committees is in fact the entire
set of voters. Thus, in the generalized compound games considered here, the n
voters vote k times according to the rules of various games. These k results are
combined via a k-voter game. This process defines a new game, preserving the
strength and/or simplicity of the original games.
As opposed to the situation with disjoint committees, here there is no
sense any irreducible strong simple games. Nevertheless, the three-voter democracy
Dem3 together with the n dictatorships can be singled out as basic games, since
when combined using this generalized composition, they generate all n-voter strong
simple games. This fact was proven by Monjardet [6, 7]. However, a new proof is
given here which makes no reference to games which are not both simple and strong.
This new proof sets a tighter bound on the number of compositions required to
generate all strong simple games, yet is completely elementary requiring no lattice
theory.
∗Author supported by URA CNRS 1304 and NATO CRG 930554.
0
To generate all n-voter strong games, an additional basic game is needed.
It is the winning game
1ˆ = {all subsets of V } = (0 . . . 0)0.
The notation [a1a2 · · ·]q means that each voter i is given ai “votes.” A coalition
wins if it attains the quota of q votes. Any game which can be expressed in this
notation is called a quota game.
Similarly, to generate all n-voter simple games, the losing game 0ˆ is needed.
0ˆ = ∅ = (0 . . . 0)1.
To generate all games, both 0ˆ and 1ˆ are needed as additional basic games.
Monjardet’s proof makes use of the well-known identification of n-voter
games with points in the free-distributive lattice on n-generators FDn. [8] The
generators i themselves represent dictatorial games in which C is a winning coalition
if and only if the dictator i ∈ C.
Given three elements of a distributive lattice S, T, U , one defines their me-
dian to be the meet of their joins:
m(S, T, U) = ST + SU + TU = (S + T )(S + U)(T + U).
In terms of games, the median law is the composition of the three games with Dem3.
FDn is a self-dual lattice. (The dual of any given element can be found
by expressing it in terms of the generators and exchanging “meet” with “join”
throughout.) Many interesting properties of games can be expressed in terms of this
duality. In a strong game S (resp. simple, resp. strong simple), we have S ≥ S∗ in
FDn (resp. S ≤ S
∗, resp. S = S∗). In the language of free distributive lattices, this
property is called supraduality (resp. infraduality, resp. ipsoduality).complement
loses.
It is obvious that if S, T, U ∈ FDn are all ipsodual (resp. infradual, resp.
supradual), then so will be their median, since
m(S, T, U)∗ = m(S∗, T ∗, U∗).
However, less obvious is the result proven by Monjardet that all ipsodual elements
can be generated from the n dictatorial games via repeated application of the median
operation.
Theorem 1 (Monjardet [6, 7]) Let FMn be the smallest set containing the gen-
erators of FDn and closed under the median operation. Given S ∈ FDn, S is
ipsodual if and only if S ∈ FMn.
In other words, strong simple games can be identified with elements of the free
median set. That is to say, all games can be thought of as compositions of triples
of simpler games, where the simplest games of all are dictatorial.
See [3] for additional motivation and notation.
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2 Quotient Games
Let S be a strong simple game with player set V , and let f : V → W be some
function. Define the quotient game f(S) = {A ⊆ W : f (−1)(A) ∈ S}. V can be
thought of as a set of offices and W as a set of voters. f describes which offices are
held by which voters.
Voters which appear in no minimal winning coalitions are called dummies,
otherwise voters are called powerful. If f is non-surjective, then certain voters will
hold no office, and thus be dummies. If f is non-injective, then certain voters will
combine the functions of several offices. A single vote of a voter is taken into account
as the vote of each of his offices. If f is bijective, then f(S) is isomorphic to S.
Note that the minimal winning coalitions of f(S) are the images of certain
minimal winning coalitions of S.
If S is a quota game, then f(S) will also be a quota game in which the
weight of each voter is equal to the sum of the weights of his offices.
Our first proof of Theorem 1 depends on the following two lemmata.
Lemma 1 Let S be a game with voter set of V , and let f : V → W be some
function. Then f(S) is a game on W. If S is strong (resp. simple), then f(S) is
too.✷
Proof: f (−1) is a monotone function from 2W to 2V , thus f(S) is a game.
Suppose S is simple, and B ∈ f(S). Then f (−1)(B) ∈ S. Hence, V − f (−1)(B) =
f (−1)(W −B) 6∈ S. Strength follows as W −B 6∈ f(S).✷
Lemma 2 All nondictatorial strong simple games are the medians of strong simple
games with a strictly greater number of dummies.
Proof: Let x, y, z be distinct powerful voters. Let fij : V → V fix all
members of V with the exception of i for which fij(i) = j. We will show that
S = m(fxy(S), fyz(S), fzx(S)). (1)
If so, then we have expressed S in terms of strong simple games involving at most
n− 1 powerful voters.
Let T denote the right hand side of equation (1). Since |S| = |T | = 2n−1, it
will suffice to show that S ⊆ T . Suppose, A ∈ S. Consider then the possible values
of |A ∩ {x, y, z}| :
0. If x, y, z 6∈ A. Then A ∈ fxy(S), fyz(S), fzx(S). Thus, A ∈ T .
1. Without loss of generality, suppose x ∈ A, and y, z 6∈ A. Then A ∈
fyz(S), fzx(S), so A ∈ T .
2. Without loss of generality, suppose x, y ∈ A, and z 6∈ A. Then A ∈
fxy(S), fzx(S), so A ∈ T .
3. If x, y, z ∈ A. Then A ∈ fxy(S), fyz(S), fzx(S). Thus, A ∈ T.✷
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Proof of Theorem 1: Since the number of dummies is bounded by n − 1,
Monjardet’s theorem now follows by induction. QED.
We have the following result more generally.
Theorem 2 Let S be a game (resp. strong game, resp. simple game, resp. strong
simple game) with at least two powerful voters. Then S is the median of three games
(resp. strong games, resp. simple games, resp. strong simple games) with a strictly
greater number of dummies.
Proof: If S is a strong simple game, then the lemma above suffices since all
nondictatorial games have at least two powerful voters.
If S has three or more powerful voters, then the above reasoning is still
valid.
If S has exactly two powerful voters (say x and y) then S must either
be the simple majority game xy = (1, 1, 0, 0, . . .)2 or the strong majority game
x + y = (1, 1, 0, 0, . . .)1. In the game xy, the participation of both x and y are
needed to win, whereas in x+ y the participation of either is sufficient. Notice that
xy = m(Dictx, Dicty, 1ˆ) and x + y = m(Dictx, Dicty, 0ˆ) where Dictx and Dicty
denote dictatorship by x and y respectively. (Note that in the games 0ˆ and 1ˆ, all
voters are dummies.✷
Corollary 1 All games (resp. strong games, resp. simple games) can be generated
via generalized composition of various dictatorships, and the three-voter democracy
Dem3 = (1, 1, 1)2 along with 0ˆ and 1ˆ (resp. 0ˆ alone, resp. 1ˆ alone).
Proof: By induction, all games can be reduced via Dem3 to games of the
same “type” having only 0 or 1 powerful voters. The only games with 1 powerful
voter are the dictatorships. The only games with no powerful voters are the prede-
termined win 1ˆ and the predetermined loss 0ˆ. The former is strong and the latter
is simple.✷
Note that the dictatorships along with 0ˆ, 1ˆ, or = (1, 1)1, and and = (1, 1)2
also forms a minimal basis from which all games can be constructed. In other
words, all monotonic boolean functions can be written as a for example conjunction
of disjunctions.
3 Weight
Define the weight of a strong simple game S, to be the number of times the median
operation must be iterated in order to generate S from dictatorships. In other
words, a game S is of weight 0 if it is a dictatorship. For k > 0, S is of weight k
if it is the median of three strong simple games of weight k − 1 or less, but not the
median of three strong simple games of weight k − 2 or less.
Define Dem03 to be the unique one-voter strong simple game Dem1, and
Demd+13 = Dem3[Dem
d
3, Dem
d
3, Dem
d
3]. Dem
d
3 is clearly a transitive strong simple
game on 3d voters. A strong simple game has weight at most d if and only if it is
quotient of Demd3.
Let W (n) be the largest weight of an n-voter strong simple game.
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Proposition 1 (1) For n ≤ 6, W (n) is given by the following table.
n 1 2 3 4 5 6
W (n) 0 0 1 2 3 3
(2) For n ≥ 6, W (n) ≤ n− 3.
(3) W (n) is asymptotically greater than ln 2ln 3n.
(4) W (n) is weakly increasing, restricted growth function. ie. W (n + 1)
always equals either W (n) or W (n) + 1.
Proof: (1) See above.
(2) By the proof of theorem 1 above, the weight of a strong simple game on
n voters is no more than one greater than the largest such weight on n− 1 voters.
(3) Every n-voter strong simple game is a quotient of Dem
W (n)
3 . There are
n3
W (n)
such quotients. Whereas, (see [1]) for n odd, the number of strong simple
games is asymptotically
2(
n−1
(n−1)/2) exp


(
n− 1
(n− 1)/2
)(
2−(n−1)/2 + 3n22˙−n−4 − n2˙−n−2
)
+(
n− 1
(n+ 3)/2
)(
2−(n+3)/2 + n22˙−n−6 − n2˙−n−5
)

 ,
and for n even,
2(
n−1
n/2) exp


(
n− 1
n/2− 1
)(
2−n/2−1 + n2˙−n−4
)
+(
n
n/2 + 1
)(
2−n/2−1 + n22˙−n−5 − n2˙−n−4
)

 .
In either case, taking the double ln of these asymptotic formulas yields
W (n) 
n ln 2
ln 3
−
ln lnn
ln 3
−
ln
(
(ln 2)2/2pi
)
ln 9
+O(n−1).
(4)W (n) is a restricted growth function by the proof of theorem 1. Now, let
S be an n-voter strong simple game of weightW (n). Let ι(S) = S∪{A∪{n+1} : A ∈
S} be the corresponding n+1-voter game in which the additional voter is powerless.
By hypothesis, ι(S) is a quotient of Dem
W (n+1)
3 . However, S = ι(S)n,n+1 is a
quotient of ι(S). Thus, S is a quotient of Dem
W (n+1)
3 . Hence, W (n+1) ≥W (n).✷
4 Choice Function
A finite multi-player deterministic sequential-move perfect-knowledge game can be
represented by a labeled rooted tree. The label of an internal node indicates which
player must move. His move consists of the selection of a child of that node. The
label of a leaf indicates the winner of the game. Without loss of generality, we
can consider only choice binary trees, since choices between a large number of
possibilities can be made via iterated binary choices.
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The win-type of a game-tree is the set of winning coalitions. A coalition is
said to be winning if it has a combined strategy that ensures that the winner of the
game will be one of its members.
Let τ be the game-tree
(
a
ւ ց
τ1 τ2
)
, (2)
where τ1 and τ2 are sub-game-trees with win-types S1 and S2 respectively, and
a ∈ V is a player. What is the win-type S of the game τ?
Obviously, A ⊆ V wins τ if it wins both τ1 and τ2. Moreover, if a ∈ A ⊆ V ,
then A can win τ even if it wins only one of τ1 and τ2. Thus, S = (S1 ∩ S2 ∪ {A ∈
S1 ∪ S2 : a ∈ A} We will denote this combination of S1 and S2 by χa(S1, S2) and
call it the choice by a between S1 and S2.
Proposition 2 (1) The win-type of a game-tree is a strong simple game.
(2) Conversely, all strong simple games are the win-type of some game-tree.
Proof: (1) By induction on game-trees.
If the height is zero, then the tree is trivial. It contains one node. The
game is an automatic win for some player. A coalition is winning if and only if it
contains this player. The win-type is a dictatorship by this player.
Otherwise, τ is of the form χa(S1, S2) where S1 and S2 are strong simple
games. Let a ∈ A and B = X \ A. If A 6∈ χa(S1, S2), then A 6∈ S1 and A 6∈ G.
Thus, B ∈ S1 and B ∈ S2. Thus, B ∈ χa(S1, S2). Conversely, if A ∈ χa(F , S2),
then A ∈ S1 or A ∈ S2. In either case, B 6∈ χa(S1, S2).
(2) Consider the following game. Players take turns eliminating all but one
of the coalitions in S to which they belong (if any). After each player has taken his
turn there will be one set left. The first member of this set wins.✷
Thus, the functions χa together with the dictatorships can be used to gen-
erate all strong simple games.
Alternate Proof of Theorem 1: Notice that χa(S, T ) = m(S, T,Dicta);
m(S, T,Dicta) = (S ∩ T ) ∪ (S ∩Dicta) ∪ (T ∩Dicta)
= (S ∩ T ) ∪ {A : a ∈ A ∈ S} ∪ {A : a ∈ A ∈ T }
= χa(S, T ).
Since χ generates all strong simple games, a fortiori m does.✷
5 Depth
In analogy to Monjardet’s definition of weight, define the depth of a strong simple
game S, to be the number of times the choice functions must be iterated in order
to generate S from dictatorships. In other words, a game S is of depth 0 if it is
a dictatorship. S is of depth k > 0 if it is the choice by some player between two
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strong simple games of depth k−1 or less, but not between two strong simple games
of depth k − 2 or less.
S is of depth k if it is the win-type of a game-tree of height k and no such
game-tree of lesser height. Let Bk be the complete binary tree of height k. Label
the nodes of Bk consecutively with the integers 1 to 2
n+1 − 1.
B0 = (1), B1 =
(
1
ւց
2 3
)
, and B2 =

 1ւց2 3
ւ↓ ↓ց
4 5 6 7


S is of depth k if and only if it is a quotient of the 2n+1 − 1 voter strong simple
game Bk.
Let D(n) be the largest depth of an n-voter strong simple game.
Proposition 3 (1) The depth of any strong simple game is at least as great as its
weight. Thus, D(n) ≥W (n).
(2) D(n) is nondecreasing.
(3) D(n) is asymptotically greater than n.
(4) D(n) is asymptotically less than pi2n3/72.
(5) Let S be a strong simple game of weight w. S has depth at most 2w−1.
This bound can not be improved in general.
Proof: (1) χa(S, T ) = m(S, T,Dicta).
(2) Let S be an n-voter strong simple game of depth D(n). Let ι(S) be the
corresponding n+1-voter game in which the additional voter is powerless. Let ι(S)
be the win-type of an n+1-player game-tree of depth d. Since the additional player
is powerless, we can arbitrarily relabel nodes of the game-tree to form an n-player
game-tree of win-type S. Thus, D(n+ 1) ≤ d ≤ D(n).
(3) There are n2
d+1−1 ways to label Bd with n players. Thus, there are at
most n2
d+1−1 n-player strong simple games of depth d or less. Compare with [1].
(4) Proof of theorem 2.
(5) Let τ (resp. τ ′, τ ′′) be the game-tree of Demw−13 with voters labelled
1 to 3w−1 (resp. 3w−1 + 1 to 2× 3w−1, 2× 3w−1 to 3w). Place a copy of τ ′ and τ ′′
under each leaf of τ . The resulting tree is the game-tree of Demw3 . By induction,
the height of the tree is 2w − 1.
No smaller tree can represent Demw3 since every vertical chain in a game-
tree gives rise to a winning coalition and Demw3 has no winning coalitions smaller
than 2w.✷
Given a strong simple game S, and two voters x, y ∈ V . Say that x is
at least as influential as y, written x ≥ y or x ≥S y if for all A ∈ S, we have
(A− {y}) ∪ {x} ∈ S.
Proposition 4 Influence is a pre-order on the set of voters.
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Proof: (Reflexivity) Let x ∈ A ∈ S. Then (A− {x}) ∪ {x} = A ∈ S.
(Transitivity Let x ≤ y ≤ z. Let x ∈ A ∈ S. Then y ∈ B = (A − {x}) ∪
{y} ∈ S. Hence, C = (B − {y}) ∪ {z} ∈ S. Note that C = (A− {x}) ∪ {z}.✷
If S is a quota game, then the influence relation is total. wx ≥ wy implies
x ≥ y.1
In the proof of lemma 2, we defined fxy(S). Informally, Sxy = fxy(S) is
the voting scheme in which x “leaves the room” having left instructions to vote
according to y. Thus,
Sxy = {A : y 6∈ A and A ∈ S, or y ∈ A and A ∪ {x} ∈ S}.
Similarly, we can imagine a voting scheme Sx/y in which x “leaves the room” having
left instructions to vote against y. Thus,
Sx/y = {A : y ∈ A ∈ S, or y 6∈ A and A ∪ {x} ∈ S}.
Proposition 5 Let S be a game. Sx/y is a game if and only if x is less influential
than y, x ≤S y.
Proof: Sx/y is a game if and only if whenever A ∈ Sx/y, we have A∪ {a} ∈
Sx/y for all a ∈ V .
Suppose A ∈ Sx/y. If a 6= y, then A ∪ {a} ∈ Sx/y, since S is a game.
On the other hand, let a = y. The condition A ∪ {y} ∈ Sx/y is of interest
only if y 6∈ A. In that case, it reduces to the question of whether A ∪ {x} ∈ S
implies A ∪ {y} ∈ S. In other words, whether x ≤S y.✷
Let S = (w1, w2, . . . , wn)q be a quota game. Without loss of generality,
suppose w1 ≥ wn. Then
Sn1 = (w1 + wn, w2, w3, . . . , wn−1, 0)q and (3)
Sn/1 = (w1 − wn, w2, w3, . . . , wn−1, 0)q−wn (4)
are both quota games. If S was a homogeneous or efficient quota game (i.e., all
minimal winning coalitions equal the total), then so is Sn1 and Sn/1.
The opposition Sx/y plays the same role in choice function χ decompositions
as the quotient Sxy = fxy(S) played in median decompositions (lemma 2).
Proposition 6 Let S be a strong simple game, and suppose i ≤S j. Then
S = χi(Sij , Si/j).
Proof: Say A needs i if A ∈ S and A− {i} 6∈ S. Clearly, if A ∈ S does not
need i, then A ∈ Sij and A ∈ Si/j . Thus, A ∈ χi(Sij , Si/j).
If A ∈ S needs i, then either j ∈ A in which case A ∈ Sij or j 6∈ A in which
case A ∈ Si/j . In either case, A ∈ χi(Sij , Si/j).✷
In formally, this means that S is a “choice” by player i of whether to join
forces with player j or to oppose him.
1Nevertheless, the influence relation on S6,23 is total 1 > 2 ∼ 3 > 4 ∼ 5 > 6, yet S6,23 is not a
quota game. See §A.
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Corollary 2 If S is a n-voter quota game (n ≥ 3) then S has weight at most n−2.
Proof: By induction, and equations (3) and (4).✷
[2, Lemma 2] can be thought of as the converse of corollary 2, since it uses
methods similar to equations (3) and (4) to enumerate all quota games.
Note however that for some strong simple games, no pair of distinct voters
are comparable via influence. The only example with less than seven vertices is the
icosahedral game I = S6,30: Associate each of six voters with a pair of opposite
vertices on an icosahedron. A coalition is winning if and only if it contains a face.
(See §A.)
Such games prevent us from generalizing the reasoning of corollary 2.
A Classification of strong simple games
In Table 1, we classify strong simple games according to their height and weight.
Table 1 includes all 30 isomorphism classes of strong simple games with up to six
powerful voters, as well as those with a transitive automorphism group and up to
eight powerful voters, and those of weight or height up to two. Each isomorphism
class is listed only once.
Games S are grouped according to their number n of powerful voters as
indicated in the first column. The second column provides the weights of a quota
game if applicable, or otherwise identifies the game. The remaining columns give
the weight w and depth d of the game along with some optimal decompositions.
Those case where our methods do not give (or are not known to give) optimal
decompositions are marked ∗ (or ∗?). A question mark appears when optimality of
d or w is uncertain. A ♥ appears in the first column if the game has a transitive
automorphism group.
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Table 1: Classification of Strong Simple Games
n S w m-Median decomposition d χ-Choice decomposition
1♥ (1)1 0 − 0 −
3♥ (111)2 1 m((100)1, (010)1, (001)1) 1 χ3((100)1, (010)1)
4 (2111)3 2 m((1110)2, (1101)2, (1011)2) 2 χ4((1000)1, (1110)2)
5 (22111)4 2 m((11100)2, (11010)2, (11001)2) 2 χ5((11100)2, (11010)2)
5 (31111)4 2 m((10000)1, (11100)2, (10011)2) 2 ∗χ1((11100)2, (10011)2)
5 (32211)5 2 m((11100)2, (11010)2, (10101)2) 3 χ5((21110)3, (11100)2)
5♥ (11111)3 3 m((20111)3, (12011)3, (01211)3) 3 χ5((01110)2, (21110)3)
6 (411111)5 3 m((100000)1, (310111)4, (001000)1) 3 χ6((100000)1, (311110)4)
6 (522211)7 3 m((100000)1, (320211)5, (001000)1) 3 χ6((311110)4, (211100)3)
6 (433111)7 3 m((100000)1, (130111)4, (001000)1) 3 χ3((130111)4, (100000)1)
6 (533211)8 3 m((100000)1, (230211)5, (001000)1) 4? χ6((211100)3, (322110)5)
6 (422111)6 2 m((100000)1, (111000)2, (000111)2) 2 ∗χ1((111000)2, (000111)2)
6 (543221)9 3 m((100000)1, (120110)3, (013111)4) 3 χ3((120110)3, (310111)4)
6 (332111)6 2 m((111000)2, (110100)2, (001011)2) 3 χ6((111000)2, (221110)4)
6 (432211)7 2 m((111000)2, (110100)2, (100011)2) 3 χ6((211100)3, (221110)4)
6 (542222)9 3 m((100000)1, (220111)4, (013111)4) 3 ∗?χ1((220111)4, (013111)4)
6 (332221)7 3 m((301111)4, (120110)3, (012110)3) 3 χ2((301111)4, (001110)2)
6 (222111)5 3 m((301111)4, (130111)4, (013111)4) 3 χ2((301111)4, (002111)3)
6 (322211)6 3 m((301111)4, (230211)5, (013111)4) 3 χ2((301111)4, (102211)4)
6 (211111)4 3 m((301111)4, (220111)4, (013111)4) 3 χ6((211100)3, (221110)4)
6 S6,21 3 m((100000)1, (120101)3, (012110)3) 3 ∗?χ1((120101)3, (012110)3)
6 S6,22 3 m((100000)1, (221110)4, (010112)3) 3 ∗?χ1((221110)4, (010112)3)
6 S6,23 3 m((031111)4, (102110)3, (310111)4) 3 χ2((200111)3, (102110)3)
6 S6,24 3 m((021110)3, (102101)3, (210110)3) 3 χ6((122110)4, (211210)4)
6 S6,25 3 m((031111)4, (102101)3, (310111)4) 3 χ6((122110)4, (221110)4)
6 S6,26 3 m((021110)3, (203112)5, (210110)3) 4? χ6((122110)4, (311220)5)
6 S6,27 2 m((000001)1, (111000)2, (001110)2) 2 χ6((111000)2, (001110)2)
6 S6,28 2 m((110001)2, (101010)2, (011100)2) 3 χ3((110001)2, (110221)4)
6 S6,29 3 m((200111)3, (020111)3, (002111)3) 3 χ1((020111)3, (002111)3)
6♥ I = S6,30 3 m((302112)5, (230121)5, (023211)5) 5? *
2 m(S6,28, (111220)4)
7 B2 2 m((1110000)2, (0001110)2, (0000001)1) 2 ∗χ7((1110000)2, (0001110)2)
7 2 m((1110000)2, (0001110)2, (0000111)2) 3 χ1((0011221)4, (0101221)4)
7 2 m((1110000)2, (1001100)2, (1000011)2) 3 χ2(S6,27, (3001111)4)
7 2 m((1110000)2, (0011100)2, (0000111)2) 3 χ7(S6,27, S
′
6,27)
7♥ Fano 4? m(S6,22, S
′
6,22, S
′′
6,22) 5?*
3 χ7(S6,22, χ7(S
′′′
6,22, S
′′′′
6,22))
7♥(1111111)4 3 m((2011111)4, (1201111)4, (0121111)4) 4? χ7((1111100)3, (2111110)4)
8 2 m
(
(11100000)2, (00011100)2,
(00000111)2
)
3 χ8(S6,27, S
′
6,27)
9♥ Dem23 2 m
(
(111000000)2, (000111000)2,
(000000111)2
)
3 χ9(B2, B
′
2)
9
